Networked electric-vehicle (EV) charging increasingly depends on advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) for charging authorization, metered-energy reporting, and demand-response control, making authenticated key establishment a safety-relevant communication requirement. This study reconstructs the security-relevant equations of a recently developed elliptic-curve multi-phase authentication protocol and evaluates whether its claimed properties follow from the specified algebra. Six structural weaknesses are identified: reversible exposure of the infrastructure private-key term, long-term key disclosure through the proposed signature equation, replay susceptibility inside the timestamp window, lack of binding between authentication and ephemeral Diffie-Hellman values, dual session-key definitions, and static-identity linkability. Advanced Metering Infrastructure–Secure Multi-Phase Authentication (AMI-SMPA) is designed with signed credentials, transcript-bound ephemeral elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman, Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF), role-separated HMAC key confirmation, Advanced Encryption Standard in Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM), rotating aliases, and replay-aware state. The protocol is mapped to the EV, EV supply equipment, charging-station controller, smart meter (SM), data concentrator, and utility control center (UCC); it protects station-meter-to-utility metering and charging-control messages without replacing ISO 15118. In an isolated emulator, all four reconstructed attack conditions succeeded in 1,000/1,000 trials, whereas all corresponding AMI-SMPA checks succeeded in 1,000/1,000 trials. A controlled 1,000-run profile estimated 16.92 ms computation time, 19.35 ms end-to-end latency, 612 bytes/session, 4.35 mJ/session, 99.14% packet-delivery ratio, 98.77% replay detection, 98.76% unauthorized message-modification rejection (UMR), and 97.63% key-compromise containment. A fixed-seed, all-at-once EV charging burst model for 50, 200, and 1,000 charging points yielded 60.36–60.46 completed sessions/s, with queue-inclusive mean completion time rising from 423.69 to 8,279.05 ms. These controlled results support protocol-level feasibility and expose capacity-planning requirements; they do not establish operational-network performance or power-grid stability.